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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OK MOTORS, INC., d/b/a 
MOUNTAIN MOTORS, 
Plaintiff—Appellant 
v s • 
CHARLES P. HILL, 
Defendant—Respondent 
Civil No, 87021S-CA 
Category No. 14b 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to U'tah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a- 3(c), as 
amended in 1986. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This case is an appeal from an Order of the Eighth 
C i r c ii i !:: C o i 11: t i: <:> r IJ t a h C o i i n t } > w h I c h g r a n t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t"" 3 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Whether the plaintiff/ on appeal, may assert 
additional facts which it failed to timely submit to the Circuit 
Court prior to the hearing.of the defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment? 
2. Whether, by virtue of the non-conformity of the 
automobile to the contract, Mr. Hill made a timely and effective 
rejection of its delivery, or a revocation of its acceptance? 
3. Whether, by virtue of defects rendering the automo-
bile inoperable, the contract is voidable under the doctrine of 
failure of consideration? 
4. Whether, because of the oppressive and one-sided 
nature of the agreement, the disclaimers of warranties set forth 
in the contract are unconscionable? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The defendant believes that the following statutes, 
rules and regulations are fundamental or important for a deter-
mination of the issues presented for review herein: Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, Sections 70A-2-302, 70A-2-313, 
70A-2-314 70A-2-601, 70A-2-602, 70A-2-606, 70A-2-607, 70A-2-608, 
15 U.S.C. Section 2308(b), and 15 C.F.R. § 455. Each of these 
provisions is set forth in the Addendum* 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature and Course of the Proceedings Below 
This case is an appeal from an order granting the defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment based upon remedies under the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code and under the bommon law theories of 
unconscionability and failure of consideration. 
On January 31/ 1986, the plaintiff filed its Complaint 
alleging that the defendant, Charles P. Hill, breached an 
agreement to purchase a 1981 Volkswagen by virtue of Mr. Hill's 
cancellation of the contract and stopping payment on the check 
paid for an automobile. (Record at 1). Within the time required 
by law, the defendant answered the plaintiff's Complaint and 
filed its Counterclaim. The defendant admitted that he had 
stopped payment on the check, and affirmatively alleged that he 
had cancelled his contract with the plaintiff for the reason that 
shortly after the delivery of the automobile to him, it became 
totally inoperable. (Record at 5). Subsequent to the filing of 
the defendant's Answer and Counterclaim, the parties performed 
discovery in the nature of Interrogatories, Requests for 
Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions. (Record at 
21, 53, 75). On or about February 24, 1987, Mr. Hill filed his 
Motion for Summary Judgment against the plaintiff, (Record at 95) 
and on March 31, 1987, the Court entered a minute entry granting 
the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at 128). A 
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final Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
signed by the Court on May 4, 1981. (Record at 129)* 
B. Procedural Background of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
With respect to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by 
Mr. Hill on February 24, 1987, it is important to note the proce-
dural status of the case at that time. As stated, Mr. Hill's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on February 24, 1987. 
(Record at 95). Three days thereafter, Ralph C. Amott withdrew as 
counsel for the plaintiff. (Record at 114). Michael J. Petro, 
the present counsel for the plaintiff, gave notice of his 
appearance as counsel for the plaintiff at the hearing on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment held on March 11, 1987. (Record at 
121). At that time, the plaintiff failed to present any counter-
affidavits or other sworn submissions to controvert either the 
Affidavit of Diane S. Hill or the Defendant's Answers to the 
Plaintiff's Interrogatories filed earlier in the case. 
Therefore, at the time of the hearing, the plaintiff proceeded 
relying only upon its Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the 
arguments raised at the hearing, and its answers to the 
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories. (Record at 21). 
C. Factual Background of Case 
The appellant's statement of the case contains numerous 
statements which are not factual, are erroneous or improper. 
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Because several of these statements are asserted or relied upon 
by the appellant throughout the body of its brief/ the defendant 
makes the following statement which it beliteves accurately 
reflects the record. 
1. The Undisputed Facts on Appeal 
Charles P. Hill/ who was a resident of Delta, Utah at 
the time in question (Record at 4) , appeared at the plaintiff's 
place of business on or about December 17/ 1985/ and on that date 
was shown and test drove a 1981 Volkswagen Rabbit. (Record at 76). 
The test drive of the automobile constituted "driving the car 
around two or three blocks at speeds less than 30 m.p.h." (Id.) 
Thereafter, Mr. Hill returned to his home in Deltaf Utah. 
Two days laterf on December 19/ 1985/ Mr. Hill returned 
to the plaintiff's place of business and tendered to plaintiff a 
check in the amount of $2/642.88/ and possession of the car was 
delivered to him. (Record at 77). Subsequent to thisf Mr. Hill 
drove the car toward Salt Lake City. After driving 
"approximately 50 miles from the plaintiff's place of business, 
the car simply quit moving and would not go forward or backward." 
(Record at 79). 
Because of the breakdown/ Mr. Hill left the car on the 
shoulder of the highway (Record at 79) and called his wife. 
(Record at 116 - 117). Upon speaking with her husband/ Mrs. Hill 
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telephoned the plaintiff1s place of business and spoke with an 
employee who identified herself as "Stacy." (Record at 117). 
Stacy told Mrs. Hill that the plaintiff would tow the automobile 
back to its lot and that one of her bosses would contact the 
Hills regarding the breakdown. (Record at 117). After making 
numerous follow-up telephone calls to the plaintiff, the Hills 
stopped payment on the check, and only then received a response 
from the plaintiff's president who refused to make any repairs to 
the vehicle and demanded immediate payment. (Record at 117 -
120). As a result, the Hills returned the keys to the plaintiff. 
(Record at 117) . 
The facts set forth above are all contained in the 
Record as part of the defendant's answers to the plaintiff's 
Interrogatories or in the Affidavit of Diane S. Hill. These 
facts are all admissible, and under the standards of Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, formed the foundation upon 
which the Circuit Court based its decision. 
2. The "Facts" Which are Illusory or 
Otherwise Improperly Asserted by the 
Plaintiff 
Several of the "facts" set forth in the plaintiff's sta-
tement of the case and throughout the plaintiff's brief are 
illusory, are not supported by sworn statements, are not 
admissible, or are otherwise improper under Rule 56. Because 
these "facts" are critical to the disposition of this appeal, 
issue is taken with each of these below. 
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In the first paragraph of the plaintiff's Statement of 
the Case, (Plaintiff at 2) , and throughout its brief (e.g./ 
Plaintiff at 6)/ the plaintiff alleges that Mr. Hill purchased 
the vehicle on as "As Is" basis and "signed his agreement to such 
a statement (attached as Exhibit B) and accepted delivery of the 
automobile." (Record at 16). In Mr. Hill's answers to the 
plaintiff's Requests for Admissions No. 2, Mr. Hill admitted only 
that the signature on the alleged Buyer's Gbide appeared to be 
his, and denied the remaining allegations of the Request for the 
reason that he was not certain that the Buyer's Guide was 
complete at the time of the sale. (Record kt 84). Based upon 
the record, the most that could be said is that an incomplete 
Buyer's Guide contained what appeared to be the defendant's 
signature. 
In the second paragraph of its Statement of the Case 
(Plaintiff at 2-3)/ the plaintiff alleges that upon speaking with 
Mrs. Hill regarding the breakdown/ the plaihtiff's secretary/ 
Stacy Dixonf advised Mrs. Hill that there were "three examples" 
of what might be done to the vehicle. The record/ howeverf con-
tains no affidavit or sworn statement to support what she alle-
gedly said. A review of the Plaintiff's Answers to the 
Defendant's Interrogatories contained in th^ Record at Pages 21 
through 32/ shows only that Mr. Jim Skelton, the office manager 
of the plaintiff/ prepared and verified the Plaintiff's Answers 
to the Defendant's Interrogatories. Therefore, Mr. Hill objects 
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to the statements allegedly attributable to Stacy Dixon since 
they are hearsay, and as such are inadmissible and form an 
inappropriate basis to support the plaintiff's objection to a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In the third paragraph of the Statement of the Case, 
(Plaintiff at 3), the plaintiff alleges that in a telephone 
conversation between the plaintiff1s president, Sarkas Barakat 
and Mrs. Hill, Mrs. Hill was reminded that the automobile was 
sold "As Is" and that Mr. Hill had been informed that srtie was 
responsible for any defects in the vehicle. With respect to this 
allegation, the Record is completey devoid of any sworn statement 
of Mr. Barakat relative to his conversation with Mrs. Hill or 
with any other individual, and any such statement, if made, was 
hearsay, and is inadmissible. Therefore, this allegation is 
improperly presented as part of the plaintiff1s brief. 
In the plaintiff's Summary of the Argument (Plaintiff 
at 2-5) and throughout the text of the plaintiff's argument, the 
plaintiff continually alleges that Mr. Hill had "the opportunity 
to inspect and test drive the vehicle over a two day period." 
(Record at 4, 9, 12 - 13, 16 and 17). This allegation is untrue 
and should not be considered for the reason that Mr. Hill resides 
in Delta, Utah. There is no evidence whatsoever before the Court 
that Mr. Hill was able to perform a further examination of the 
vehicle during the two-day period between the time when he test 
drove the car and returned to Orem to take delivery. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under clear standards of Utah law, in an appeal from an 
Order granting a Motion for Summary Judgment/ the party moved 
against may not set forth additional facts or allegations which 
not presented by Affidavit or otherwise prober under Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore/ the plaintifffs 
reliance upon facts which are inadmissible or otherwise improper 
under Rule 56/ and which are not supported in the Record/ are not 
properly before the Court/ and provide no support for the plain-
tiff's arguments. 
By virtue of the vehicle's failure to conform to the 
contract/ Mr. Hill made a timely and effective rejection of the 
delivery of the vehicle/ and if the Court finds that he had 
accepted the vehicle/ he made a timely and effective revocation 
of his acceptance based upon the non-conformity which substan-
tially impaired the value of the automobile to Mr. Hill. 
The December 19/ 1985/ contract whereunder Mr. Hill 
agreed to buy a 1981 VW Rabbit Diesel from the plaintiff was 
voidable under the doctrine of failure of qonsideration for the 
reason that Mr. Hill gave full performance of his obligation 
under the contract/ and the plaintiff failed to tender his 
performance by its delivery of an inoperative automobile. 
The plaintiff's exclusions of the implied warranty of 
merchantability were unenforceable against Mr. Hill for the 
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reason that they were so grossly oppressive and one sided as to 
render the disclaimers unconscionable. As a result of the unen-
forceability of these provisions, the parties' agreement was 
clothed with the implied warranty of merchantability under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, and due to the latent defect in the 
automobile, this warranty was breached. Mr. Hill was, therefore, 
entitled to cancel the contract. 
ARGUMENT 
In its Brief on Appeal, the plaintiff has assailed each 
of the theories under which the Circuit Court granted Mr. Hill's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Sucinctly, the Circuit Court found 
in favor of Mr. Hill for the following reasons: Mr. Hill 
rejected the plaintiff's tender of the automobile after disco-
vering its non-conformity, or if Mr. Hill "accepted" the automo-
bile, he duly revoked his acceptance (U.C.A. §§ 70A-2-S01, 
70A-2-608); the contract was duly avoided by Mr. Hill for failure 
of consideration; and, finally, the disclaimer of warranties was 
unconscionable (U.C.A. § 70A-2-302). As a result, Mr. Hill was 
entitled to cancel the contract based upon the plaintiff's breach 
of the implied warranty of merchantability. (U.S.A. 5 
70A-2-314). 
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POINT I 
THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT ARE LIMITED TO THOSE 
WHICH WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT. 
As pointed out in the Statement of the Case, the plain-
tiff failed to file any sworn submissions to dispute the allega-
tions of the Affidavit of Diane S. Hill, and the only sworn 
submissions of the plaintiff consisted of its answers to the 
Defendants First Set of Interrogatories. (Record at 21-32). 
Under the law of the State of Utah, while the Court is to view 
the facts in a summary judgment in a light most favorable to the 
party moved against, Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983), 
if the opposing party fails to file affidavits controverting 
those of the movant, the facts set forth ir} the movant's affida-
vits and other sworn submissions are deemed admitted. Under this 
circumstance, the party moved against is bound by the movant's 
affidavits and has waived the right to rai^e other "facts" on 
appeal in a belated effort to create genuine issues of material 
fact. Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877 (Utah 1979), Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1983). In addition, any submissions in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment must set forth facts that would be 
admissible into evidence. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1983). Therefore, by the plaintiff1s failure to submit affida-
vits at the time of the hearing, it waived its right to contro-
vert the Affidavit of Mrs. Hill and the other sworn statements of 
the defendant, and the hearsay statements attributable to Sarkas 
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Barakat, Jeff Lush and Stacy Dixon, if they were material, are 
not properly before this Court and may not be relied upon by the 
plaintiff to support its position. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT MADE A TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE REJECTION 
OF THE AUTOMOBILE. 
Under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, if goods or a 
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the 
contract, and if the buyer does not accept the goods, he may 
reject them. (U.C.A. § 70A-2-601, 70A-2-607, 1953, as amended) 
A. The Automobile Failed to Conform to the Contract 
Section 2-106(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code states 
that: 
"Goods or conduct, including any part of a performance, 
are Conforming1 or conform to the contract when they 
are in accordance with the obligations under the 
contract." 
In this case, the plaintiff agreed to sell Mr. Hill a used 1981 
Volkswagen Rabbit. Based upon Mr. Hill's examination of the 
vehicle, his test drive, and the seller's representation that is 
was a "good car" and much better than the other vehicle Mr. Hill 
had looked at (Record at 76), the agreement for purchase implied 
that the automobile would function for a reasonable period of 
time as it did at the time of the test drive and inspection. In 
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fact/ the automobile was not operative and failed to conform, in 
that respect, to the contract. 
In its Brief on Appeal, the plaintiff asserts that, in 
essence, the alleged "As Is" clause of the contract eliminated 
any responsibility of the seller as to the condition of the auto-
mobile. The commentary to Section 2-313 (Express Warranties) of 
the Uniform Commercial Code discusses the foundation of the law 
of warranties stating that its "whole purpose . . . is to deter-
mine what it is that the seller has agreed to sell . . . ." The 
commentary goes on to state that "a contract is normally a 
contract for a sale of something describable and described . . ." 
and that 
"[a] clause generally disclaiming fall warranties 
express or implied1 cannot reduce a seller's obligation 
with respect to such description and, therefore, cannot 
be given literal effect under 2-31S." (Exclusion and 
modification of warranties) 
In support of this position, the plaintiff cites cases 
from the states of Oregon and Kansas which it claims stand for 
the proposition that when goods are sold "As Is" they conform to 
the contract regardless to how illusory or oppressive the result. 
(Plaintiff's Brief at 6). The plaintiff's reliance upon these 
cases is improper. In Clark v. Ford Motor Company, 46 Or. App. 
521, 612 P.2d 316 (1984), the Court was faced with a factual pat-
tern clearly distinguishable from that of the present case. In 
Clark, the purchaser had purchased a new vehicle from a dealer. 
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The manufacturer had given the purchaser an express warranty, and 
the seller disclaimed all warranties, express or implied. A 
reading of the case indicates that the Oregon Court made its 
decision on a factual pattern vastly different from the present 
case, and did not rule "that a used car sold 'as is' cannot be 
found to be conforming 'by definition' because the buyer received 
exactly what he bargained for" as claimed in the plaintiff's 
Brief* (Plaintiff's Brief at 6). Moreover, the Court specifi-
cally noted that there was no issue raised by the plaintiff as to 
the effectiveness of the disclaimer and declined to make any 
judgment as to its effectiveness. 612 P.2d at 319, Note 5. 
The plaintiff also relies upon the case of International 
Petroleum Services, Inc. v. S and N Well Service, Inc., 230 Kan. 
452, 639 P.2d 29 (1982). In that case, the specific issue before 
the Court was whether the implied warranties of the Uniform 
Commercial Code applied to the sale of used goods. The Court 
held that these warranties may arise in the context of the sale 
of used goods, but stated that there may be situations where the 
warranties do not arise, including when the warranties are 
disclaimed and the goods offered for sale "as is" or "with all 
faults." 539 P.2d at 34. However, the Court specifically noted 
that the requirements of the disclaimer statute must be met and 
that the limitation must also meet the standards of the Kansas 
Consumer Protection Act KSA Section 50-639(c) (d), which allows a 
seller to disclaim such warranties only if he is able to 
establish that the buyer had knowledge of the defects. 
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In all fairness, the Clark and International Petroleum 
cases are inapposite when viewed in light of the facts of this 
case. Their facts are clearly distinguishable as are the rights 
and remedies of the buyers in those cases. As a result/ these 
cases fail to compel the conclusion sought by the plaintiff and 
provide no support for its appeal. 
The better approach to the problem of non-conformity and 
disclaimers of warranties was taken in the case of Blankenship v. 
Northtown Ford, Inc., 95 111. App. 3d 303, 420 N.E.2d 167 (1981), 
where the Court held that a dealer would not be allowed to avoid 
a buyer's cancellation of a contract by virtue of its technical 
compliance with Section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The Court rejected what it called the "logical extension" of the 
dealerfs argument which was, in essence, that by disclaiming 
warranties, a purchaser's cancellation would be barred in the 
event that the seller sold a car that turned out not to have an 
engine. 420 N.E.2d at 171. 
Because of the substantial defect which caused the auto-
mobile to break down and become inoperative, the vehicle failed 
to conform to the contract and Mr. Hill was entitled to his 
right to reject the delivery, or if he had already given his 
"acceptance" of the vehicle, to revoke his acceptance. U.C.A. §§ 
2-601, 2-608. 
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B. The Defendant Never Accepted Delivery of _the Rabbit 
The mere act of taking possession does not constitute an 
"acceptance" under the provisions of the Utah Commercial Code 
because/ under the Code, a buyer is not deemed to have accepted 
goods until he has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them. 
U.C.A. § 70A-2-606(l)(a). 
The case of Shelton v. Farkas, 30 Wash. App. 549, 635 
P.2d 1109 (1981) presents a factual pattern which is nearly iden-
tical to that of this case. In Shelton, the defendant went to 
the plaintiff's place of business for the purpose of purchasing a 
violin. The seller represented that the violin was of good 
quality, and that the price was discounted because the buyer was 
"willing to take it on an 'as is' basis." 535 P.2d at 1111. Two 
days after the purchase, the defendant presented the violin to 
her instructor, who immediately informed her that it had a poor 
tone, that it had a crack in the body and was not the right 
instrument for her. When the seller refused to refund the defen-
dant's money, she stopped payment on the check. At the trial of 
the action, the Court found in favor of the defendant, and the 
seller appealed. 
On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court and rejected the seller's contention that the "as is" 
clause of the contract precluded the buyer's right to reasonably 
inspect the goods prior to acceptance or to revoke after accep-
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tancef noting that the use of an "as is" expression is relevant 
only to exclusion or modification of warranties. Citing the 
White and Summers Treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code, the 
Court went on to note that the passing of title is unrelated to 
whether a buyer has accepted goods (See Commentary to Uniform 
Commercial Code § 2-606, Comment No* 2), and that "in the usual 
case, the buyer will have had possession of the goods for some 
time before he has 'accepted them1". Finally, following the 
requirements of § 2-606 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Court 
held that "acceptance" of goods occurs only after the buyer has 
had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them and signifies to the 
seller that they are conforming or that he will retain them in 
spite of their non-conformity. 635 P.2d at 1113. Based on this 
analysis, the Court ruled that under the facts of the case, a 
two-day period to accept was within a reasonable time to do so. 
In Zabrieski Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 
441, 5 UCCRS 30, 240 A.2d 195 (1968), a case dealing with a 
defective automobile, the Court recognized that the purchaser 
does not accept goods until he has had "a reasonable opportunity 
to inspect them." The Court went on to hold that the proverbial 
"spin around the block does not provide a reasonable opportunity 
to inspect, and further stated that the seller's contentions in 
this regard were illusory and unrealistic." 5 UCCRS at 38. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Hill performed the ritualistic 
spin around the block and then two days later took possession of 
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the Rabbit. After traveling approximately 50 miles, the car had 
broken down and was completely inoperative. Under the standards 
identified above, when the car broke down within two hours after 
its delivery, Mr. Hill was still within the ambit of "the reaso-
nable opportunity to inspect." Therefore, acceptance cannot be 
deemed to have occurred, and Mr. Hill was entitled to reject the 
tender of the vehicle. 
Throughout its Brief, the plaintiff refers to an alleged 
two-day period within which Mr. Hill could have inspected the 
vehicle. The plaintiff's allegation in this regard is illusory 
and distorted for the reason that, as stated in the Statement of 
the Case, at the time of the purchase, Mr. Hill was a resident of 
Delta, Utah, and after his initial test drive of the vehicle, he 
returned to his home in Delta. Therefore, any allegations of the 
plaintiff relative to Mr. Hill's "two-day opportunity to inspect" 
are misleading, not supported by the Record, and form an insuf-
ficient basis for the plaintiff's contentions. 
C. The Defendant Seasonably Notified the Plaintiff of 
the Rejection and Effectively Cancelled the Contract 
Under Section 2-601 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a 
buyer can reject a delivery of goods "if the goods fail in any 
respect to conform to the contract." As shown above, the automo-
bile failed to conform to the contract and at the time of the 
breakdown Mr. Hill had not yet had a reasonable opportunity to 
inspect the vehicle. 
-18-
Section 70A-2-602 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
states that "rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time 
after their delivery or tender" and that rejection "is ineffec-
tive unless, the buyer seasonably notifies the seller." Although 
what constitutes a reasonable time for rejection is considered a 
question of fact to be determined from the circumstances of the 
case, Christopher v. Larsen Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1012 
(Utah 1976) , it is undisputed that the Hills notified the plain-
tiff of the defect almost immediately after the car broke down, 
(Record at 117). It is further undisputed that the Hills 
attempted several other communications with the plaintiff, that 
for several days the plaintiff refused to return the Hills1 
calls, and that after the Hills had stopped payment on the check, 
the plaintiff refused to repair the car. (Record at 117). It is 
also undisputed that after the plaintiff refused to repair the 
car, the Hills returned the keys to the plaintiff. (Record at 
117). Under these facts, it is clear that the Hills simply could 
not have given notice of their rejection any sooner than when 
made. Therefore, based upon these undisputed facts, the Hills 
effectively rejected the delivery of the Rabbit and cancelled the 
contract. U.C.A. §§ 70A-2-602, 70A-2-711. 
POINT III 
IF DELIVERY WAS ACCEPTED, MR. HILL EFFECTIVELY 
REVOKED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE RABBIT. 
Even if Mr. Hill "accepted" the automobile, he "revoked" 
his acceptance. See U.C.A. § 70A-2-608. Under Section 
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70A-2-608 (1) (b) of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer may 
revoke his acceptance of goods whose non-conformity substantially 
impairs its value to him if he has accepted the goods without 
discovery of the non-conformity and his acceptance was reasonably 
induced by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance. See 
Ford Motor Credit Company v. Harper, 671 P.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 
1982) . 
A. The Rabbit1s Non-conformity Substantially Impaired 
its Value to Mr^ Hill 
The non-conformity of the vehicle is established by 
Hill's uncontroverted affidavit. Therefore, the initial inquiry 
on the issue of revocation of acceptance is whether the non-
conformity substantially impaired the value of the vehicle to Mr. 
Hill. In analyzing the issue of impairment of value, the Court 
looks to the effect of the impairment on the particular buyer, 
and most Courts have agreed that while the test is subjective, 
the issue is best resolved by looking at the objective evidence 
available to the Court rather than on the personal belief of the 
buyer. Aubrey1s RV Center v. Tandy Corp., 46 Wash. App. 595, 
731 P.2d 1124, 1128 (1987) and Fargo Machine and Tool Company 
v. Carney and Trecker, 428 F. Supp. 364, 379 (East. Dist. Mich. 
1977). It has also been stated that "the test for substantial 
impairment is . . . at bottom a common sense perception." Ford 
Motor Credit Company v. Harper, 671 F.2d at 1124. Common sense 
compels the conclusion that the 1981 Rabbit was purchased for the 
-20-
purpose of providing transportation to Mr. Hill, and that when 
it broke down and would not move forward or backward, and the 
plaintiff refused responsibility for any repairs/ any antici-
pated value the vehicle may have had to Mr. Hill was completely 
destroyed. 
The plaintiff raises arguments that the value of the 
vehicle is not substantially impaired to Mr. Hill. (Plaintiff's 
Brief at 11-12). First, the plaintiff argues that Mr. Hill 
should have expected to make repairs to the vehicle regardless of 
when they became necessary. Second, the plaintiff assumes that 
the vehicle could have been repaired, and argues that Mr. Hill 
had an obligation to show that the car could not have been 
repaired. 
These arguments simply beg the question of whether, in 
light of the facts before the court, a finding of substantial 
impairment of value was supportable. The undisputed and only 
facts before the Court show that the automobile broke down and 
would not move forward and backward (Record at 79), that Mr. 
Hill's wife contacted the plaintiff and was assured that the 
plaintiff would tow the car back to its lot (Record at 117), that 
the car was never recovered by the plaintiff (Record at 80), and 
that the plaintiff refused to make any repairs or inspection. 
These facts compel the conclusion that the value of the vehicle 
to the defendant was substantially impaired. Presumably, the car 
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was sold for storage fees and the nature and extent of the break 
down will never be determined. Under the facts set forth above, 
the Hills were entitled to rely upon the plaintiff's represen-
tations th.at it would tow the car back to its lot, and inasmuch 
as the plaintiff failed to do sof any common sense perception of 
Mr. Hill's description of the breakdown compels the conclusion 
that the value of the vehicle to Mr. Hill was destroyed. 
B. The Defect was Latent 
It is undisputed that Mr. Hill accepted the Rabbit 
without knowledge of the non-conformity, and it is axomatic his 
acceptance was induced by the difficulty of its discovery. The 
latent nature of the car's defect prevented its discovery until 
Mr. Hill had driven the car approximately 50 miles. Certainly, 
any reasonable person would not have purchased such a vehicle 
having knowledge of that defect. 
C. The Defendant Gave Timely Notice of Revocation 
Timeliness of a notice of revocation of acceptance, as 
with notice of rejection, should be determined from the cir-
cumstances of the case. Christopher v. Larsen Ford Sales, Inc., 
supra. The official comment to Section 2-608 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code states that notice of revocation of acceptance 
should be made "within a reasonable time after discovery of the 
grounds for such revocation." The commentary goes on to state 
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that "this reasonable time period should extend in most cases 
beyond the time in which notification of breach must be given, 
beyond the time of discovery of non-conformity after acceptance, 
and beyond the time for rejection after tender." Official com-
mentary to Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-608, No. 4. 
As stated above, the defendant gav& notice of revocation 
immediately after the defect was discovered. Subsequently, there 
were several telephone calls placed to the plaintiffs place of 
business, a telephone call between Mrs. Hill and Mr. Barakat, and 
finally a letter from Mrs. Hill to the plaintiff in which the 
keys to the Rabbit were returned to the plaintiff. (Record at 
119-120). Under the circumstances, all of which are supported by 
the Affidavit of Diane S. Hill and uncontroverted as well as by 
the defendant's answers to the plaintiff's Interrogatories, the 
revocation was timely within the meaning of Section 70A-2-608. 
Therefore, based upon the timely notice of a non-conformity with 
the contract which substantially impaired the value of the 
vehicle to Mr. Hill, Mr. Hill effectively cancelled the contract 
and the decision of the Circuit Court should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE CONTRACT IS VOIDABLE FOR FAILURE OF 
CONSIDERATION. 
The consideration for the December 19, 1985, contract 
was the delivery of a 1981 VW Rabbit Diesel which would provide 
adequate transportation for a reasonable time. Because of the 
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defect in the automobile, the contract is subject to rescission 
based on the doctrine of failure of consideration. 
In reference to the defense of failure of consideration, 
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the defense "exists 
wherever one who has either given or has promised to give some 
performance fails, without his fault, to receive in some material 
respect the agreed exchange for that performance." Bentley v. 
Potter, 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984), citing Williston, Law of 
Contracts, Section 814 at 17-78 (3rd ed. 1962). The facts in 
this case clearly fit this definition. By tendering his check to 
the plaintiff, Mr. Hill gave his performance, and due to no fault 
of his own, received an automobile that proved totally defective 
and inoperable. Simply put, Mr. Hill did not receive what he 
bargained for. 
The plaintiff argues that by virtue of the alleged "as 
is" sale, the contract for sale was supported by adequate con-
sideration. In support of this position, the plaintiff cites the 
case of Yanish v. Fernandez, 156 Colo. 255, 397 P.2d 881 (1965). 
The plaintiff claims that the Yanish case stands for the proposi-
tion, in effect, that any "as is" contract for the sale of goods, 
no matter how illusory or one-sided, is supported by adequate 
consideration. Yanish makes no such claim, but rather is based 
upon warranty theories and makes no ruling whatsoever that "as 
is" contracts are, as a matter of law, supported by con-
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sideration. The undisputed facts before th^ Court compel one 
conclusion: Mr. Hill did not receive what he bargained for and 
was promised/ that the contract failed for lack of consideration/ 
and that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed. 
POINT V 
THE PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIONS OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES ARE 
INEFFECTIVE FOR THE REASON THAT THEY ARE 
UNCONSCIONABLE. 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code express and implied 
warranties may be excluded by meeting certain requirements. See 
U.C.A. § 70A-2-316. However, as with all contract provisions/ 
disclaimers of warranties are unenforceable if they are 
unconscionable. See § 70A-2-302. See also 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b). 
A. Plaintiff1s Exclusions of Warranty are 
Unconscionable and Hencey Unenforceable 
In cases with facts almost identical to the case at bar. 
Courts of other jurisdictions have found exclusionary language 
such as that in this case unconscionable. For example, in 
Industralease v. RME Enterprises/ 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1977) the respondent leased equipment from the appellant 
which/ once installed/ never worked. The lease contained 
language disclaiming all express and implied warranties. The 
issue before the Court was whether the disclaimers were 
unconscionable under circumstances where the equipment never 
operated. The Court stated that "although the statute prescribes 
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that we are to determine unconscionability as of the time of the 
making of the contract/ we cannot divorce entirely the events 
which occurred later." 396 N.Y.S. at 432. After finding that 
the equipment did not work at all and did not achieve any of the 
purposes intended by the parties, the Court held that the result 
was "so one-sided . . . that the disclaimer in good conscience 
should not be enforced . . . " and that "the disclaimer of warran-
ties is unconscionable under the circumstances and should not be 
enforced." Id. Other cases reaching the same conclusion on 
similar facts are Safarti v. M A Hittner & Sons, Inc., 318 
N.Y.S.2d 352 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); Eckstein v. Cummins, 321 
N.E.2d 897 (Ohio App. 1974); and LaVere v. R.M. Burritt Motors, 
Inc., 446 N.Y.S.2d 851 (City Ct. N.Y. 1982). 
In the case of Resource Management Corporation v. 
Western Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 
1985) , the Utah Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of 
unconscionability. The Court identified at least three standards 
by which unconscionability is tested: 
1. Whether in light of the general commercial 
background and the general commercial needs of the par-
ticular trade or case, the clauses are so one-sided as 
to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at 
the time of the making of the contract . . . . The 
principal is one of the prevention of oppression and 
unfair surprise. Official comment to U.S.C. § 2-302. 
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2. Whether the clause or contract is one that 'no 
decent fair-minded person would view without being 
possessed of a profound sense of injustice.1 Carlson v. 
Hamilton, 275 P.2d 989, 8 Utah 2d ?72 (1958). 
3. Whether the contract shows an overall imbalance in 
the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain. 
Bekins Bar-V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983). 
The Court also recognized the rule that while unconscionability 
is generally determined at the time the contract is made, a Court 
may refuse to enforce a contract where subsequent events turn out 
to be such as were not within the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties at the time the contract was entered. 706 P.2d at 
1045-46, citing Link v. Wirtz, 638 P.2d 985, 986 (Kan. 1982). 
This case presents a factual pattern that falls clearly 
within the parameters of each of the tests recognized by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Mr. Hill was most certainly surprised, and 
unfairly so, when he discovered that the automobile he had 
purchased from a reputable dealer, and had paid for minutes 
earlier was inoperable. Certainly no fair-minded person could 
view enforcement of the contract as anything less than a sanction 
of a transaction, which from its inception was entirely out of 
balance and imposed upon Mr. Hill a total forfeiture of the 
bargain he anticipated. Finally, the oppressive result of the 
disclaimer serves only to promote unfair surprise, making the 
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contract wholly one-sided, with the plaintiff receiving over 
$2,500.00/ and Mr. Hill receiving an inoperable and worthless 
vehicle. 
While giving lip service to the policy of preventing 
opression and unfair surprise, the plaintiff makes much ado about 
the policy of not disturbing the allocation of risks allegedly 
contemplated by the contract, and again argues that Mr. Hill "had 
two days to bargain for, inspect and accept the automobile and 
should not have been surprised by the "as is" contract." 
(Plaintiff at 14-18). As pointed out above, this "two-day" argu-
ment is completely misleading. While Mr. Hill may not have been 
"surprised" at the nature of the contract, like any other 
purchaser of an automobile from a reputable dealer, he was most 
certainly surprised, and unfairly so, when the car broke down 
minutes after leaving the plaintiff's lot and when the dealer 
refused any assistance of any kind. 
The plaintiff goes on to assert that the "Buyer's Guide" 
required by the Federal Trade Commission "was developed . . . to 
better establish buyer and seller responsibilities." While this 
may be the result desired by automobile dealers, it most cer-
tainly was not the reason for the development of the Buyer's 
Guide. Rather, due to the unscrupulous sales activities of 
dealers of used automobiles who would make oral representations 
of quality and warranty only to disclaim them in the sales 
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contract/ the FTC promulgated the regulation requiring the 
Buyer's Guide in order to prevent these "unfair and deceptive 
acts or practices . . • ." 16 C.F.R. § 455(a)(b)and(c). 
The obvious intent of this regulation is to protect the consumer/ 
and interestingly, the plaintiff now attempts to use the regula-
tion as a sword, forcing Mr. Hill into an entirely one-sided 
bargain/ which no reasonable person would view without seeing its 
injustice. The federal regulation, in any kvent/ should not 
supplant the applicable provisions of Utah law cited in this 
Brief. 
In its final argument/ the plaintiff points out that the 
UCC requires that the parties "be afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence" as to the commercial setting of the 
contract. UCA 70A-2-302(2). Thisf the plaintiff argues, is 
reversable error. 
This argument call for two responses. First/ the tran-
saction in question is one with which nearly all adults in our 
society are familiar/ and its commercial setting is one of which 
a court may take judicial notice. Second/ and perhaps finally 
arriving at the crux of the reason for this appeal, under the 
U.C.C. the plaintiff is entitled only to a "reasonable" oppor-
tunity to present evidence. As stated at the initiation of this 
Brief/ in a Motion for Summary Judgment/ the party moved against 
has the obligation to submit affidavits or other sworn sub-
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missions which raise genuine issues of material fact. When the 
party fails to do so, he is deemed to have admitted the facts 
asserted by the movant, and has waived his right to contest those 
facts. Franklin Financial, supra. Moreover, since the plaintiff 
has failed to file opposing affidavits, the Court may assume that 
no material facts exist which would counter those submitted by 
the defendant. The plaintiff waived its right to raise addi-
tional facts on the issue of unconscionability, and inasmuch as 
the facts before the Court show a bargain so oppressive and one-
sided that any fair-minded person would be affected with a pro-
found sense of injustice, the decision of the Circuit Court 
should be affirmed and this appeal dismissed. 
B. The Plaintiff Breached the Implied Warranty of 
Merchantability 
The language attempting to exclude all express and 
implied warranties is unconscionable and hence, unenforceable. 
Therefore, at minimum, the transaction is clothed with implied 
warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose. Under the 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, for goods to be 
merchantable they must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which 
such goods are used. In Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 
554 P.2d 349 (Wash. App. 1976), the Court addressed the question 
of merchantability and used automobiles. Referring to the com-
mentary to § 2-314 of the U.C.C., the Court stated that "The 
measure of a used car's merchantability turns . . . on its 
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operative qualities," 554 P.2d at 354, and went on to state that 
"[to] be fit for the purpose of driving, a four-year old automo-
bile . . must be in reasonably safe condition and substantially 
free of defects which render it inoperable." I^d. Under facts 
showing substantial defects in the car, the Court held that since 
the car did not meet this standard it was not "merchantable" 
within the meaning of § 2-314 of the U.C.C. 
Applying this test to the present case, it is clear that 
the vehicle sold by the plaintiff was not merchantable because, as 
in the Testo case, after only a short period of time, the car 
would not operate due to latent defects. Therefore, Mr. Hill is 
entitled to his remedies under the Code, including cancellation 
of the contract. U.C.A. § 70A-2-711. 
CONCLUSION 
At the time Mr. Hillfs Motion for Summary Judgment was 
heard by the Circuit Court, the facts before the Court were 
undisputed. Those same facts are before this Court in the Record 
on Appeal and the plaintiff cannot now belatedly present addi-
tional facts not supported by the Record. The contract for the 
purchase of the automobile was cancelled by Mr. Hill due to his 
rejection of its delivery, or his revocation of its acceptance. 
Moreover, the contract was voidable under the doctrine of failure 
of consideration. Finally, by virtue of the contract's 
unconscionability, the contract should be clothed with the 
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implied warranty of merchantability, the breach of which entitled 
Mr. Hill to cancel the contract. 
Any of the theories of relief set forth above is suf-
ficient to affirm the judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court. 
DATED this day of October/ 1987. 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Charles P. Hill 
By " / 
MARK F. BELL 
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ADDENDUM 
§ 2 — 1 0 6 . Definitions: "Contract"; "Agreement"; "Con-
t rac t for Sale"; "Sale"; "Present Sale"; "Con-
forming" to Contract; "Termination"; "Can-
cellation" 
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires 
"contract" and "agreement" are limited to those relating to the 
present or future sale of goods. "Contract for sale" includes 
both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a 
future time. A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the 
seller to the buyer for a price (Section 2—101). A "present 
sale" means a sale which is accomplished by the making of the 
contract. 
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance 
are "conforming" or conform to the contract when they are in 
accordance with the obligations under the contract. 
(3) "Termination" occurs when either par ty pursuant to a 
power created by agreement or law puts an end to the contract 
otherwise than for its breach. On "termination" all obligations 
which are still executory on both sides are discharged but any 
r ight based on prior breach or performance survives. 
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either par ty puts an end to 
the contract for breach by the other and its effect is the same 
as that of " terminat ion" except tha t the cancelling party also 
retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any 
unperformed balance. 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: Subsection (1)—Section 1 
(1) and (2), Uniform Sales Act; 
Subsection (2)—none, but sub-
section generally continues pol-
icy of Sections 11, 44 and 69, Uni-
form Sales Act; Subsections (3) 
and (4)—none. 
Changes: Completely rewritten. 
Purposes of Changes and New 
Matter: 
1. Subsection (1) : "Contract 
for sale" is used as a general con-
cept throughout this Article, but 
the rights of the parties do not 
vary according to whether the 
transaction is a present sale or a 
contract to sell unless the Article 
expressly so provides. 
2. Subsection (2) : It is in 
general intended to continue the 
policy of requiring exact per-
formance by the seller of his ob-
ligations as a condition to his 
right to require acceptance. 
However, the seller is in part 
safeguarded against surprise as 
a result of sudden technicality on 
the buyer's part by the provisions 
of Section 2—508 on seller's cure 
of improper tender or delivery. 
Moreover usage of trade fre-
quently permits commercial lee-
ways in performance and the lan-
guage of the agreement itself 
must be read in the light of such 
custom or usage and also, prior 
course of dealing, and in a long 
term contract, the course of per-
formance. 
3. Subsections (3) and (4): 
These subsections are intended to 
make clear the distinction carried 
forward throughout this Article 
between termination and cancel-
lation. 
Cross References: 
Point 2: Sections 1—203, 1— 
205, 2—208 and 2—508. 
Definitional Cross References: 
"Agreement". Section 1—201. 
"Buyer". Section 2—103. 
"Contract". Section 1—201. 
"Goods". Section 2—105. 
"Party". Section 1—201. 
"Remedy". Section 1—201. 
"Rights". Section 1—201. 
"Seller". Section 2—103. 
§ 2 — 3 0 2 . Unconscionable Contract or Clause 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time 
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it 
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon-
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any uncon-
scionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the 
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the par-
ties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evi-
dence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the 
court in making the determination. 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: None. 
Purposes: 
1. This section is intended to 
make it possible for the courts to 
police explicitly against the con-
tracts or clauses which they find 
to be unconscionable. In the 
past such policing has been ac-
complished by adverse construc-
tion of language, by manipula-
tion of the rules of offer and 
acceptance or by determinations 
that the clause is contrary to 
public policy or to the dominant 
purpose of the contract. This 
section is intended to allow the 
court to pass directly on the un-
conscionability of the contract 
or particular clause therein and 
to make a conclusion of law as 
to its unconscionability. The 
basic test is whether, in the 
light of the general commercial 
background and the commercial 
needs of the particular trade or 
case, the clauses involved are 
so one-sided as to be unconscion-
able under the circumstances ex-
isting at the time of the making 
of the contract. Subsection (2) 
makes it clear that it is proper 
for the court to hear evidence 
upon these questions. The prin-
ciple is one of the prevention of 
oppression and unfair surprise 
(Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 
172 F.2d 80, 3d Cir. 1948) and not 
of disturbance of allocation of 
risks because of superior bar-
gaining power. The underlying 
basis of this section is illustrat-
ed by the results in cases such 
as the following: 
Kansas City Wholesale Gro-
cery Co. v. Weber Packing Cor-
poration, 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 
1272 (1937), where a clause lim-
iting time for complaints was 
held inapplicable to latent de-
fects in a shipment of catsup 
which could be discovered only 
by microscopic analysis; Hardy 
v. General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation, 38 Ga.App. 463, 144 
S.E. 327 (1928), holding that a 
disclaimer of warranty clause 
applied only to express warran-
ties, thus letting in a fair im-
plied warranty; Andrews Bros, 
v. Singer & Co. (1934 CA) 1 K.B. 
17, holding that where a car 
with substantial mileage was de-
livered instead of a "new" car, a 
disclaimer of warranties, includ-
ing those "implied," left unaf-
fected an "express obligation" 
on the description, even though 
the Sale of Goods Act called 
such an implied warranty; New 
Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. G. 
A. Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 189 
N.W. 815 (1922), holding that a 
clause permitting the seller, up-
on the buyer's failure to sup-
ply shipping instructions, to can-
cel, ship, or allow delivery date 
to be indefinitely postponed 30 
days at a time by the inaction, 
does not indefinitely postpone 
the date of measuring damages 
for the buyer's breach, to the 
SALES § 2-303 
seller's advantage; and Kansas 
Flour Mills Co. v. Dirks, 100 
Kan. 376, 164 P. 273 (1917), 
where under a similar clause in 
a rising market the court per-
mitted the buyer to measure his 
damages for non-delivery at the 
end of only one 30 day postpone-
ment; Green v. Arcos, Ltd. 
(1931 CA) 47 T.L.R. 336, where 
a blanket clause prohibiting re-
jection of shipments by the buy-
er was restricted to apply to 
shipments where discrepancies 
represented merely mercantile 
variations; Meyer v. Packard 
Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio 
St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922), in 
which the court held that a 
"waiver" of all agreements not 
specified did not preclude im-
plied warranty of fitness of a re-
built dump truck for ordinary 
use as a dump truck; Austin Co. 
v. J. H. Tillman Co., 104 Or. 541, 
209 P. 131 (1922), where a 
clause limiting the buyer's rem-
edy to return was held to be ap-
plicable only if the seller had de-
livered a machine needed for a 
construction job which reasona-
bly met the contract description; 
Bekkovold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 
216 N.W. 790, 59 A.L.R. 1164 
(1927\ refusing to allow war-
ranty of fitness for purpose im-
posed by law to be negated by 
clause excluding all warranties 
"made" by the seller; Robert A. 
Munroe & Co. v. Meyer (1930) 2 
KB. 312, holding that the war-
ranty of description overrides a 
clause reading "with all faults 
and defects" where adulterated 
meat not up to the contract de-
scription was delivered. 
2. Under this section the 
court, in its discretion, may re-
fuse to enforce the contract as a 
whole if it is permeated by the 
unconscionability, or it may 
strike any single clause or group 
of clauses which are so tainted 
or which are contrary to the es-
sential purpose of the agreement, 
or it may simply limit uncon-
scionable clauses so as to avoid 
unconscionable results. 
3. The present section is ad-
dressed to the court, and the 
decision is to be made by it. The 
commercial evidence referred to 
in subsection (2) is for the 
court's consideration, not the ju-
ry's. Only the agreement which 
results from the court's action 
on these matters is to be submit-
ted to the general triers of the 
facts. 
Definitional Cross Reference: 
"Contract". Section 1—201. 
§ 2 — 3 1 3 . Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, De-
scription, Sample 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller 
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes 
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirma-
tion or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of 
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty 
that the goods shall conform to the description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis 
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the 
whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or 
model. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express war-
ranty that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or 
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"guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a 
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods 
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or 
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
s ion: Sections 12, 14 and 16, 
Uniform Sales Act. 
Changes: Rewrit ten. 
Purposes of Changes: To con-
solidate and systematize basic 
principles with the result t h a t : 
1. "Expres s" war ran t ies rest 
on "dickered" aspects of the 
individual bargain, and go so 
clearly to the essence of tha t 
bargain tha t words of disclaim-
er in a form are repugnant to 
the basic dickered terms. "Im-
plied" war ran t i es rest so clear-
ly on a common factual si tuation 
or set of conditions tha t no par-
t icular language or action is 
necessary to evidence them and 
they will ar ise in such a situa-
tion unless unmistakably negat-
ed. 
This section reverts to the 
older case law insofar as the 
warrant ies of description and 
sample are designated "express" 
ra ther than "implied". 
2. Although this section is 
limited in its scope and direct 
purpose to warran t ies made by 
the seller to the buyer as par t of 
a contract for sale, the war ran ty 
sections of this Article are not 
designed in any way to dis turb 
those lines of case law growth 
which have recognized tha t war-
rant ies need not be confined ei-
ther to sales contracts or to the 
direct par t ies to such a contract . 
They may ar ise in other appro-
priate c i rcumstances such as in 
Official Comment 
the case of bailments for hire, 
whether such bailment is itself 
the main contract or is merely 
a supplying of containers under 
a contract for the sale of their 
contents . The provisions of Sec-
tion 2—318 on thi rd par ty bene-
ficiaries expressly recognize this 
case law development within one 
par t icu lar area. Beyond that , 
the mat ter is left to the case law 
with the intention tha t the poli-
cies of this Act may offer useful 
guidance in dealing with fur ther 
cases as they arise. 
3. The present section deals 
with affirmations of fact by the 
seller, descriptions of the goods 
or exhibitions of samples, exact-
ly as any other par t of a nego-
tiation which ends in a contract 
is dealt with. No specific inten-
tion to make a war ran ty is nec-
essary if any of these factors 
is made part of the basis of the 
bargain. In actual practice af-
firmations of fact made by the 
seller about the goods during a 
bargain are regarded as pa r t of 
the description of those goods: 
hence no par t icular reliance on 
such statements need be shown 
in order to weave them into the 
fabric of the agreement. Rath-
er, any fact which is to take 
such affirmations, once made, 
out of the agreement requires 
clear affirmative proof. The is-
sue normally is one of fact. 
4. In view of the principle 
that the whole purpose of the 
law of war ran ty is to determine 
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what it is that the seller has in 
essence agreed to sell, the policy 
is adopted of those cases which 
refuse except in unusual circum-
stances to recognize a material 
deletion of the seller's obliga-
tion. Thus, a contract is nor-
mally a contract for a sale of 
something describable and de-
scribed. A clause generally dis-
claiming "all warranties, ex-
press or implied" cannot reduce 
the seller's obligation with re-
spect to such description and 
therefore cannot be given literal 
effect under Section 2—316. 
This is not intended to mean 
that the parties, if they con-
sciously desire, cannot make 
their own bargain as they wish. 
But in determining what they 
have agreed upon good faith is 
a factor and consideration 
should be given to the fact that 
the probability is small that a 
real price is intended to be ex-
changed for a pseudo-obligation. 
5. Paragraph (1) (b) makes 
specific some of the principles 
set forth above when a descrip-
tion of the goods is given by the 
seller. 
A description need not be by 
words. Technical specifications, 
blueprints and the like can af-
ford more exact description than 
mere language and if made part 
of the basis of the bargain goods 
must conform with them. Past 
deliveries may set the descrip-
tion of quality, either expressly 
or impliedly by course of deal-
ing. Of course, all descriptions 
by merchants must be read 
against the applicable trade us-
ages with the general rules as 
to merchantability resolving any 
doubts. 
6. The basic situation as to 
statements affecting the true es-
sence of the bargain is no differ-
ent when a sample or model is 
involved in the transaction. 
This section includes both a 
"sample" actually drawn from 
the bulk of goods which is the 
subject matter of the sale, and a 
"model" which is offered for in-
spection when the subject mat-
ter is not at hand and which has 
not been drawn from the bulk 
of the goods. 
Although the underlying prin-
ciples are unchanged, the facts 
are often ambiguous when some-
thing is shown as illustrative, 
rather than as a straight sample. 
In genera], the presumption is 
that any sample or model just 
as any affirmation of fact is in-
tended to become a basis of the 
bargain. But there is no escape 
from the question of fact. 
When the seller exhibits a sam-
ple purporting to be drawn from 
an existing bulk, good faith of 
course requires that the sample 
be fairly drawn. But in mer-
cantile experience the mere ex-
hibition of a "sample" does not 
of itself show whether it is 
merely intended to "suggest" or 
to "be" the character of the 
subject-matter of the contract. 
The question is whether the 
seller has so acted with refer-
ence to the sample as to make 
him responsible that the whole 
shall have at least the values 
shown by i t The circumstances 
aid in answering this question. 
If the sample has been drawn 
from an existing bulk, it must 
be regarded as describing values 
of the goods contracted for un-
less it is accompanied by an 
unmistakable denial of such re-
sponsibility. If, on the other 
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hand, a model of merchandise 
not on hand is ofTeied, the mer-
cantile presumption that it has 
become a literal description of 
the subject matter is not so 
strong, and particularly so if 
modification on the buyer's initi-
ative impairs any feature of the 
model. 
7. The precise time when 
words of description or affirma-
tion are made or samples are 
shown is not material. The sole 
question is whether the lan-
guage or samples or models are 
fairly to be regarded as part of 
the contract. If language is 
used after the closing of the deal 
(as when the buyer when taking 
delivery asks and receives an 
additional assurance), the war-
ranty becomes a modification, 
and need not be supported by 
consideration if it is otherwise 
reasonable and in order (Section 
2—209). 
8. Concerning affirmations of 
value or a seller's opinion or 
commendation under subsection 
(2), the basic question remains 
the same: What statements of 
the seller have in the circum-
stances and in objective judg-
ment become part of the basis 
of the bargain? As indicated 
above, all of the statements of 
the seller do so unless good rea-
son is shown to the contrary. 
The provisions of subsection (2) 
are included, however, since 
common experience discloses 
that some statements or predic-
tions cannot fairly be viewed as 
entering into the bargain. Even 
as to false statements of value, 
however, the possibility is left 
open that a remedy may be pro-
vided by the law relating to 
fraud or misrepresentation. 
Cros9 References: 
Point 1: 
Point 2: 
and 2—318. 
Point 3 : 
(b). 
Point 4: 
Point 5: 
and 2—314. 
Point 6: 
Point 7: 
Point 8: 
Section 2—316. 
Sections 1—102(3) 
Section 2—316(2) 
Section 2—316. 
Sections 1—205(4) 
Section 2—316. 
Section 2—209. 
Section 1—103. 
Definitional Cross References: 
"Buyer". Section 2—103. 
"Conforming". Section 2— 
106. 
"Goods". Section 2—105. 
"Seller". Section 2—103. 
§ 2 — 3 1 4 . Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of 
Trade 
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2—316), a war-
ranty tha t the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a 
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect 
to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for 
value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises 
or elsewhere is a sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract 
description; and 
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(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average 
quality within the description; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods 
are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agree-
ment, of even kind, quality and quantity within each 
unit and among all units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the 
agreement may require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made 
on the container or label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2—316) other im-
plied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage 
of trade. 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: Section 15(2), Uniform 
Sales Act. 
Changes: Completely rewritten. 
Purposes of Changes: This sec-
tion, drawn in view of the stead-
ily developing case law on the 
subject, is intended to make it 
clear that: 
1. The seller's obligation ap-
plies to present sales as well as 
to contracts to sell subject to 
the effects of any examination 
of specific goods. (Subsection 
(2) of Section 2—316). Also, 
the warranty of merchantability 
applies to sales for use as well 
as to sales for resale. 
2. The question when the 
warranty is imposed turns bas-
ically on the meaning of the 
terms of the agreement as recog-
nized in the trade. Goods de-
livered under an agreement 
made by a merchant in a given 
line of trade must be of a quali-
ty comparable to that generally 
acceptable in that line of trade 
under the description or other 
designation of the goods used 
in the agreement. The responsi-
bility imposed rests on any mer-
chant-seller, and the absence of 
the words "grower or manufac-
turer or not" which appeared in 
Section 15(2) of the Uniform 
Sales Act does not restrict the 
applicability of this section. 
3. A specific designation of 
goods by the buyer does not ex-
clude the seller's obligation that 
they be fit for the general pur-
poses appropriate to such goods. 
A contract for the sale of sec-
ond-hand goods, however, in-
volves only such obligation as 
is appropriate to such goods for 
that is their contract descrip-
tion. A person making an iso-
lated sale of goods is not a "mer-
chant" within the meaning of 
the full scope of this section 
and, thus, no warranty of mer-
chantability would apply. His 
knowledge of any defects not 
apparent on inspection would, 
however, without need for ex-
press agreement and in keeping 
with the underlying reason of 
the present section and the pro-
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visions on good faith, impose an 
obligation that known material 
but hidden defects be fully dis-
closed. 
4. Although a seller may not 
be a "merchant" as to the goods 
in question, if he states general-
ly that they are "guaranteed" 
the provisions of this section 
may furnish a guide to the con-
tent of the resulting express 
warranty. This has particular 
significance in the case of sec-
ond-hand sales, and has further 
significance in limiting the ef-
fect of fine-print disclaimer 
clauses where their effect would 
be inconsistent with large-print 
assertions of "guarantee". 
5. The second sentence of 
subsection (1) covers the war-
ranty with respect to food and 
drink. Serving food or drink 
for value is a sale, whether to be 
consumed on the premises or 
elsewhere. Cases to the con-
trary are rejected. The princi-
pal warranty is that stated in 
subsections CI) and (2) (c) of 
this section. 
6. Subsection (2) does not 
purport to exhaust the meaning 
of "merchantable" nor to negate 
any of its attributes not specifi-
cally mentioned in the text of 
the statute, but arising by usage 
of trade or through case law. 
The language used is "must be 
at least such as . . . ," and 
the intention is to leave open 
other possible attributes of mer-
chantability. 
7. Paragraphs (a) and (b) 
of subsection (2) are to be read 
together. Both refer, as indicat-
ed above, to the standards of 
that line of the trade which fits 
the transaction and the seller's 
business. "Fair average" is a 
term directly appropriate to ag-
ricultural bulk products and 
means goods centering around 
the middle belt of quality, not 
the least or the worst that can 
be understood in the particular 
trade by the designation, but 
such as can pass "without ob-
jection." Of course a fair per-
centage of the least is permissi-
ble but the goods are not "fair 
average" if they are all of the 
least or worst quality possible 
under the description. In cases 
of doubt as to what quality is 
intended, the price at which a 
merchant closes a contract is an 
excellent index of the nature 
and scope of his obligation un-
der the present section. 
8. Fitness for the ordinary 
purposes for which goods of the 
type are used is a fundamental 
concept of the present section 
and is covered in paragraph ( o . 
As stated above, merchantability 
is also a part of the obligation 
owing to the purchaser for use. 
Correspondingly, protection, un-
der this aspect of the warranty, 
of the person buying for resale 
to the ultimate consumer is 
equally necessary, and mer-
chantable goods must therefore 
be "honestly" resalable in the 
normal course of business be-
cause they are what they pur-
port to be. 
9. Paragraph (d) on even-
ness of kind, quality and quan-
tity follows case law. But pre-
cautionary language has been 
added as a reminder of the fre-
quent usages of trade which per-
mit substantial variations both 
with and without an allowance 
or an obligation to replace the 
varying units. 
10. Paragraph (e) applies 
only where the nature of the 
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goods and of the transaction 
require a certain type of con-
tainer, package or label. Para-
graph (f) applies, on the other 
hand, wherever there is a label 
or container on which represen-
tations are made, even though 
the original contract, either by 
express terms or usage of trade, 
may not have required either the 
labelling or the representation. 
This follows from the general 
obligation of good faith which 
requires that a buyer should 
not be placed in the position of 
reselling or using goods deliv-
ered under false representations 
appearing on the package or 
container. No problem of extra 
consideration arises in this con-
nection since, under this Article, 
an obligation is imposed by the 
original contract not to deliver 
mislabeled articles, and the ob-
ligation is imposed where mer-
cantile good faith so requires 
and without reference to the 
doctrine of consideration. 
11. Exclusion or modification 
of the warranty of merchanta-
bility, or of any part of it, is 
dealt with in the section to 
which the text of the present 
section makes explicit precau-
tionary references. That sec-
tion must be read with particu-
lar reference to its sul^ection 
(4) on limitation of remedies. 
The warranty of merchantabil-
ity, wherever it is normal, is so 
commonly taken for granted that 
its exclusion from the contract 
is a matter threatening surprise 
and therefore requiring special 
precaution. 
12. Subsection (3) is to make 
explicit that usage of trade and 
course of dealing can create 
warranties and that they are 
implied rather than express war-
ranties and thus subject to ex-
clusion or modification under 
Section 2—316. A typical in-
stance would be the obligation to 
provide pedigree papers to evi-
dence conformity of the animal 
to the contract in the case of a 
pedigreed dog or blooded bull. 
13. In an action based on 
breach of warranty, it is of 
course necessary to show not 
only the existence of the war-
ranty but the fact that the 
warranty was broken and that 
the breach of the warranty was 
the proximate cause of the loss 
sustained. In such an action an 
affirmative showing by the seller 
that the loss resulted from some 
action or event following his 
own delivery of the goods can 
operate as a defense. Equally, 
evidence indicating that the sell-
er exercised care in the manu-
facture, processing or selection 
of the goods is relevant to the 
issue of whether the warranty 
was in fact broken. Action by 
the buyer following an examina-
tion of the goods which ought 
to have indicated the defect 
complained of can be shown as 
matter bearing on whether the 
breach itself was the cause of 
the injury. 
Cross References: 
Point 1: Section 2—316. 
Point 3: Sections 1—2u3 and 
2—104. 
Point 5: Section 2—315. 
Point 11: Section 2—316. 
Point 12: Sections 1—201, 
1—205 and 2—316. 
Definitional Cross References: 
"Agreement". Section 1—201. 
"Contract".. Section 1—201. 
"Contract for 'sale". Section 
2—106. 
"Goods". Section 2—105. 
"Merchant". Section 2—104 
"Seller". Section 2—103. 
§ 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties 
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express 
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit 
warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent 
with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article 
on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2—202) negation or 
limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction 
is unreasonable. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the im-
plied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the lan-
guage must mention merchantability and in case of a writ-
ing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any im-
plied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing 
and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties 
of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are 
no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face 
hereof." 
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all im-
plied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as 
is", "with all faults" or other language which in com-
mon understanding calls the buyer's attention to the 
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there 
is no implied warranty; and 
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has 
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully 
as he desired or has refused to examine the goods 
there is no implied warranty with regard to defects 
which an examination ought in the circumstances to 
have revealed to him; and 
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified 
by course of dealing or course of performance or usage 
of trade. 
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or 
limitation of damages and on contractual modification of rem-
edy (Sections 2—718 and 2—719). 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: None. See sections 15 and 
71, Uniform Sales Act. 
Purposes: 
1. This section is designed 
principally to deal with those 
frequent clauses in sales con-
tracts which seek to exclude "all 
warranties, express or implied." 
It seeks to protect a buyer from 
unexpected and unbargained 
language of disclaimer by deny-
ing effect to such language when 
inconsistent with language of 
express warranty and permit-
ting the exclusion of implied 
warranties only by conspicuous 
language or other circumstances 
which protect the buyer from 
surprise. 
2. The seller is protected un-
der this Article against false 
allegations of oral warranties by 
its provisions on parol and ex-
trinsic evidence and against un-
authorized representations by 
the customary "lack of author-
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i ty" clauses. This Article t rea ts 
the l imitation or avoidance of 
consequential damages as a mat-
ter of l imiting remedies for 
breach, separate from the mat te r 
of creation of liability under a 
warranty . If no war ran ty ex-
ists, there is of course no prob-
lem of limiting remedies for 
breach of warranty . Under sub-
section (4) the question of limi-
tation of remedy is governed by 
the sections referred to r a the r 
than by this section. 
3. Disclaimer of the implied 
war ran ty of merchantabi l i ty is 
permitted under subsection (2) , 
but with the safeguard tha t such 
disclaimers must mention mer-
chantabil i ty and in case of a 
wri t ing must be conspicuous. 
4. Unlike the implied war ran-
ty of merchantabil i ty, implied 
warrant ies of fitness for a par-
t icular purpose may be excluded 
by general language, but only if 
it is in wri t ing and conspicuous. 
5. Subsection (2) presup-
poses tha t the implied war ran ty 
in question exists unless exclud-
ed or modified. Whether or not 
language of disclaimer satisfies 
the requirements of this section, 
such language may be relevant 
under other sections to the ques-
tion whether the war ran ty was 
ever in fact created. Thus, un-
less the provisions of this Ar-
ticle on parol and extrinsic evi-
dence prevent, oral language of 
disclaimer may raise issues of 
fact as to whether reliance by 
the b.uyer occurred and whether 
the seller had "reason to know" 
under the section on implied 
warran ty of fitness for a part icu-
lar purpose. 
6. The exceptions to the gen-
eral rule set forth in pa ragraphs 
( a ) , (b) and (c) of subsection 
(3) are common factual situa-
tions in which the circumstances 
surrounding the t ransact ion are 
in themselves sufficient to call 
the buyer 's attention to the fact 
tha t no implied warrant ies are 
made or tha t a certain implied 
war ran ty is being excluded. 
7. Paragraph (a) of subsec-
tion (3) deals with general terms 
such as "as is," "as they stand," 
"with all faults ," and the like. 
Such terms in ordinary commer-
cial usage are understood to 
mean that the buyer takes the 
ent i re risk as to the quality of 
the goods involved. The terms 
covered by paragraph (a) are 
in fact merely a particulariza-
tion of paragraph (c) which pro-
vides for exclusion or modifica-
tion of implied warrant ies by 
usage of t rade. 
8. Under paragraph (b) of 
subsection (3) warrant ies may 
be excluded or modified by the 
circumstances where the buyer 
examines the goods or a sample 
or model of them before entering 
into the contract. "Examina-
t ion" as used in this paragraph 
is not synonymous with inspec-
tion before acceptance or at any 
other time after the contract has 
been made. It goes ra ther to the 
na ture of the responsibility as-
sumed by the seller at the time 
of the making of the contract. 
Of course if the buyer discovers 
the defect and uses the goods 
anyway, or if he unreasonably 
fails to examine the goods before 
he uses them, resul t ing injuries 
may be found to result from his 
own action ra ther than proxi-
mately from a breach of warran-
ty. See Sections 2—314 and 2— 
715 and comments thereto. 
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In order to bring the transac-
tion within the scope of "refused 
to examine" in paragraph (b), 
it is not sufficient that the goods 
are available for inspection. 
There must in addition be a de-
mand by the seller that the buyer 
examine the goods fully. The 
seller by the demand puts the 
buyer on notice that he is as-
suming the risk of defects which 
the examination ought to reveal. 
The language "refused to exam-
ine" in this paragraph is intend-
ed to make clear the necessity 
for such demand. 
Application of the doctrine of 
"caveat emptor*' in all cases 
where the buyer examines the 
goods regardless of statements 
made by the seller is, however, 
rejected by this Article. Thus, 
if the offer of examination is ac-
companied by words as to their 
merchantability or specific at-
tributes and the buyer indicates 
clearly that he is relying on 
those words rather than on his 
examination, they give rise to an 
"express" warranty. In such 
cases the question is one of fact 
as to whether a warranty of mer-
chantability has been expressly 
incorporated in the agreement. 
Disclaimer of such an express 
warranty is governed by subsec-
tion (1) of the present section. 
The particular buyer's skill 
and the normal method of exam-
ining goods in the circumstances 
determine what defects are ex-
cluded by the examination. A 
failure to notice defects which 
are obvious cannot excuse the 
buyer. However, an examina-
tion under circumstances which 
do not permit chemical or other 
testing of the goods would not 
exclude defects which could be 
ascertained only by such testing. 
Nor can latent defects be exclud-
ed by a simple examination. A 
professional buyer examining a 
product in his field will be held 
to have assumed the risk as to all 
defects which a professional in 
the field ought to observe, while 
a nonprofessional buyer will be 
held to have assumed the risk 
only for such defects as a lay-
man might be expected to ob-
serve. 
9. The situation in which the 
buyer gives precise and complete 
specifications to the seller is not 
explicitly covered in this sec-
tion, but this is a frequent cir-
cumstance by which the implied 
warranties may be excluded. 
The warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose would not 
normally arise since in such a 
situation there is usually no re-
liance on the seller by the buyer. 
The warranty of merchantability 
in such a transaction, however, 
must be considered in connection 
with the next section on the cu-
mulation and conflict of warran-
ties. Under paragraph (c) of 
that section in case of such an 
inconsistency the implied war-
ranty of merchantability is dis-
placed by the express warranty 
that the goods will comply with 
the specifications. Thus, where 
the buyer gives detailed specifi-
cations as to the goods, neither 
of the implied warranties as to 
quality will normally apply to 
the transaction unless consistent 
. with the specifications. 
Cross References: 
Point 2: Sections 2-202, 2— 
718 and 2—719. 
Point 7: Sections 1—205 and 
2—208. 
§ 2 — 6 0 1 . Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery 
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in install-
ment contracts (Section 2—612) and unless otherwise agreed 
under the sections on contractual limitations of remedy (Sec-
tions 2—718 and 2—719), if the goods or the tender of delivery 
fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may 
(a) reject the whole; or 
(b) accept the whole; or 
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest. 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: No one general equivalent 
provision but numerous provi-
sions, dealing with situations of 
non-conformity where buyer may 
accept or reject, including Sec-
tions 11, 44 and 69(1), Uniform 
Sales Act. 
Changes: Partial acceptance in 
good faith is recognized and the 
buyer's remedies on the contract 
for breach of warranty and the 
like, where the buyer has re-
turned the goods after transfer 
of title, are no longer barred. 
Purposes of Changes: To make it 
clear that: 
1. A buyer accepting a non-
conforming tender is not penal-
ized by the loss of any remedy 
otherwise open to him. This pol-
icy extends to cover and regulate 
the acceptance of a part of any 
lot improperly tendered in any 
case where the price can reason-
ably be apportioned. Partial ac-
ceptance is permitted whether 
the part of the goods accepted 
conforms or not. The only lim-
itation on partial acceptance is 
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that good faith and commercial 
reasonableness must be used to 
avoid undue impairment of the 
value of the remaining portion of 
the goods. This is the reason for 
the insistence on the "commercial 
unit" in paragraph (c). In this 
respect, the test is not only what 
unit has been the basis of con-
tract, but whether the partial ac-
ceptance produces so materially 
adverse an effect on the remain-
der as to constitute bad faith. 
2. Acceptance made with the 
knowledge of the other party is 
final. An original refusal to ac-
cept may be withdrawn by a later 
acceptance if the seller has indi-
cated that he is holding the ten-
der open. However, if the buyer 
attempts to accept, either in 
whole or in part, after his origi-
nal rejection has caused the sell-
er to arrange for other disposi-
tion of the goods, the buyer must 
answer for any ensuing damage 
since the next section provides 
that any exercise of ownership 
after rejection is wrongful as 
against the seller. Further, he 
is liable even though the seller 
SALES § 2-602 
may choose to treat his action as Cross References: 
acceptance rather than conver- Sections 2—602(2) (a), 2— 
sion, since the damage flows 612, 2—718 and 2—719. 
from the misleading notice. Such 
arrangements for resale or other 
disposition of the goods by the definitional Cross References: 
seller must be viewed as within "Buyer". Section 2—103. 
the normal contemplation of a "Commercial unit". Section 
buyer who has given notice of re- 2—105. 
jection. However, the buyer's "Conform". Section 2—106. 
attempts in good faith to dispose "Contract". Section 1—201. 
of defective goods where the sell- "Goods". Section 2—105. 
er has failed to give instructions "Installment contract". Sec-
within a reasonable time are not tion 2—612. 
to be regarded as an acceptance. "Rights". Section 1—201. 
§ 2-602. Manner and Effect of Rightful Rejection 
(1) Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time aft-
er their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer 
seasonably notifies the seller. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of the two following sections 
on rejected goods (Sections 2—603 and 2—604), 
(a) after rejection any exercise of ownership by the buyer 
with respect to any commercial unit is wrongful as 
against the seller; and 
(b) if the buyer has before rejection taken physical pos-
session of goods in which he does not have a security 
interest under the provisions of this Article (subsec-
tion (3) of Section 2—711), he is under a duty after 
rejection to hold them with reasonable care at the sell-
er's disposition for a time sufficient to permit the seller 
to remove them; but 
(c) the buyer has no further obligations with regard to 
goods rightfully rejected. 
(3) The seller's rights with respect to goods wrongfully re-
jected are governed by the provisions of this Article on Seller's 
remedies in general (Section 2—703). 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi- Purposes of Changes: To make 
sion: Section 50, Uniform Sales it clear that: 
Art 
1. A tender or delivery of 
goods made pursuant to a con-
Changes: Rewritten. tract of sale, even though wholly 
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non-conforming, requires affirm-
ative action by the buyer to avoid 
acceptance. Under subsection 
(1), therefore, the buyer is given 
a reasonable time to notify the 
seller of his rejection, but with-
out such seasonable notification 
his rejection is ineffective. The 
sections of this Article dealing 
with inspection of goods must 
be read in connection with the 
buyer's reasonable time for ac-
tion under this subsection. Con-
tract provisions limiting the time 
for rejection fall within the rule 
of the section on "Time" and are 
effective if the time set gives the 
buyer a reasonable time for dis-
covery of defects. What con-
stitutes a due "notifying" of re-
jection by the buyer to the seller 
is defined in Section 1—201. 
2. Subsection (2) lays down 
the normal duties of the buyer 
upon rejection, which flow from 
the relationship of the parties. 
Beyond his duty to hold the goods 
with reasonable care for the buy-
er's [seller's] disposition, this sec-
tion continues the policy of prior 
uniform legislation in generally 
relieving the buyer from any du-
ties with respect to them, except 
when the circumstances impose 
the limited obligation of salvage 
upon him under the next section. 
3. The present section ap-
plies only to rightful rejection 
by the buyer. If the seller haa 
made a tender which in all re-
spects conforms to the contract, 
the buyer has a positive duty to 
accept and his failure to do so 
constitutes a "wrongful rejec-
tion" which gives the seller im-
mediate remedies for breach. 
Subsection (3) is included here 
to emphasize the sharp distinc-
tion between the rejection of an 
improper tender and the non-ac-
ceptance which is a breach by 
the buyer. 
4. The provisions of this 
section are to be appropriately 
limited or modified when a nego-
tiation is in process. 
Cross References: 
Point 1: Sections 1—201, 1— 
204(1) and (3), 2—512(2), 2— 
513(1) and 2—606(1) (b). 
Point 2: Section 2—603(1). 
Point 3: Section 2—703. 
Definitional Cross References: 
"Buyer". Section 2—103. 
"Commercial unit". Section 
2—105. 
"Goods". Section 2—105. 
"Merchant". Section 2—104. 
"Notifies". Section 1—201. 
"Reasonable time". Section 
1—204. 
"Remedy". Section 1—201. 
"Rights". Section 1—201. 
"Seasonably". Section 1—204. 
"Security interest". Section 
1—201. 
"Seller". Section 2—103. 
§ 2 — 6 0 6 * What Constitutes Acceptance of Goods 
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer 
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods 
signifies to the seller that the goods are conforming or 
that he will take or retain them in spite of their non-
conformity; or 
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of 
Section 2—602), but such acceptance does not occur 
until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to 
inspect them; or 
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; 
but if such act is wrongful as against the seller it is 
an acceptance only if ratified by him. 
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is accept-
ance of that entire unit. 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi- Changes: Rewritten, the qualifi-
sion: Section 48, Uniform Sales cation in paragraph (c) and sub-
Act, section (2) being new; other-
SALES § 2-606 
wise the general policy of the 
prior legislation is continued. 
Purposes of Changes and New 
Matter: To make it clear that: 
1. Under this Article "accept-
ance" as applied to goods means 
that the buyer, pursuant to the 
contract, takes particular goods 
which have been appropriated to 
the contract as his own, whether 
or not he is obligated to do so, 
and whether he does so by words, 
action, or silence when it is time 
to speak. If the goods conform 
to the contract, acceptance 
amounts only to the perform-
ance by the buyer of one part of 
his legal obligation. 
2. Under this Article accept-
ance of goods is always accept-
ance of identified goods which 
have been appropriated to the 
contract or are appropriated by 
the contract. There is no pro-
vision for "acceptance of title" 
apart from acceptance in gener-
al, since acceptance of title is 
not material under this Article 
to the detailed rights and duties 
of the parties. (See Section 2— 
401). The refinements of the 
older law between acceptance of 
goods and of title become unnec-
essary in view of the provisions 
of the sections on effect and rev-
ocation of acceptance, on effects 
of identification and on risk of 
loss, and those sections which 
free the seller's and buyer's rem-
edies from the complications and 
confusions caused by the ques-
tion of whether title has or has 
not passed to the buyer before 
breach. 
3. Under paragraph (a), 
payment made after tender is al-
ways one circumstance tending 
to signify acceptance of the 
goods but in itself it can never 
be more than one circumstance 
and is not conclusive. Also, a 
conditional communication of ac-
ceptance always remains subject 
to its expressed conditions. 
4. Under paragraph (c), any 
action taken by the buyer, which 
is inconsistent with his claim 
that he has rejected the goods, 
constitutes an acceptance. How-
ever, the provisions of para-
graph (c) are subject to the sec-
tions dealing with rejection by 
the buyer which permit the buy-
er to take certain actions with 
respect to the goods pursuant to 
his options and duties imposed 
by those sections, without effect-
ing an acceptance of the goods. 
The second clause of paragraph 
(c) modifies some of the prior 
case law and makes it clear that 
"acceptance" in law based on the 
wrongful act of the acceptor is 
acceptance only as against the 
wrongdoer and then only at the 
option of the party wronged. 
In the same manner in which 
a buyer can bind himself, despite 
his insistence that he is reject-
ing or has rejected the goods, by 
an act inconsistent with the sell-
er's ownership under paragraph 
( c \ he can obligate himself by a 
communication of acceptance de-
spite a prior rejection under par-
agraph va). However, the sec-
tions on buyer's rights on im-
proper delivery and on the effect 
of rightful rejection, make it 
clear that after he once rejects a 
tender, paragraph (a) does not 
operate in favor of the buyer un-
less the seller has re-tendered 
the goods or has taken affirma-
tive action indicating that he is 
holding the tender open. See 
also Comment 2 to Section 2— 
601. 
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5. Subsection (2) supple- Point 4: Sections 2—601 
ments the policy of the section through 2—604. 
on buyer's rights on improper Point 5: Section 2—601 
delivery, recognizing the validi-
ty of a partial acceptance but in- Definitional Cross References: 
sisting that the buyer exercise -Buyer". Section 2-103. 
this right only as to whole com- -Commercial unit". Section 
mercial units. 
Cross References: 
Point 2: Sections 2—401, 2— 
509, 2—510, 2—607, 2—608 and 
Part 7. 
2—105. 
"Goods". Section 2—105. 
"Seller". Section 2—103. 
§ 2 — 6 0 7 . Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach; Burden 
of Establishing Breach After Acceptance; No-
tice of Claim or Litigation to Person Answer-
able Over 
(1) The buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods 
accepted. 
(2) Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of 
the goods accepted and if made with knowledge of a non-con-
formity cannot be revoked because of it unless the acceptance 
was on the reasonable assumption that the non-conformity 
would be seasonably cured but acceptance does not of itself im-
pair anv other remedv provided bv this Article for non-conform-
ity. 
(3) Where a tender has been accepted 
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered any breach notify 
the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy; 
and 
(b) if the chum is one for infringement or the like (sub-
section (3) of Section 2—312) and the buyer is sued 
as a result of such a breach he must so notify the seller 
within a reasonable time after he receives notice of 
the litigation or be barred from any remedy over for 
liability established by the litigation. 
(i) The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with 
respect to the goods accepted. 
(5) Where the bu\er is sued for breach of a warranty or oth-
er obligation for which his seller is answerable over 
(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation. 
If the notice states that the seller may come in and de-
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fend and that if the seller does not do so he will be 
bound in any action against him by his buyer by any 
determination of fact common to the two litigations, 
then unless the seller after seasonable receipt of the 
notice does come in and defend he is so bound, 
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (sub-
section (3) of Section 2—312) the original seller may 
demand in writing that his buyer turn over to him con-
trol of the litigation including settlement or else be 
barred from any remedy over and if he also agrees to 
bear all expense and to satisfy any adverse judgment, 
then unless the buyer after seasonable receipt of the 
demand does turn over control the buyer is so barred. 
(6) The provisions of subsections (3), (4) and (5) apply 
to any obligation of a buyer to hold the seller harmless against 
infringement or the like (subsection (3) i>f Section 2—312). 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: Subsection (1)—Section 
41, Uniform Sales Act; Subsec-
tions (2) and (3)—Sections 49 
and 60, Uniform Sales Act. 
Changes: Rewritten. 
Purposes of Changes: To con-
tinue the prior basic policies 
with respect to acceptance of 
goods while making a number 
of minor though material chang-
es in the interest of simplicity 
and commercial convenience so 
that: 
1. Under subsection (1), once 
the buyer accepts a tender the 
seller acquires a right to its 
price on the contract terms. In 
cases of partial acceptance, the 
price of any part accepted is, if 
possible, to be reasonably appor-
tioned, using the type of appor-
tionment familiar to the courts 
in quantum valebat cases, to be 
determined in terms of "the con-
tract rate," which is the rate de-
termined from the bargain in 
fact (the agreement) after the 
rules and policies of this Article 
have been brought to bear. 
2. Under subsection (2) ac-
ceptance of goods precludes 
their subsequent rejection. Any 
return of the goods thereafter 
must be by way of revocation of 
acceptance under the next sec-
tion. Revocation is unavailable 
for a non-conformity known to 
the buyer at the time of accept-
ance, except where the buyer has 
accepted on the reasonable as-
sumption that the non-conformi-
ty would be' seasonably cured. 
3. All okher remedies of the 
buyer remajin unimpaired under 
subsection J2). This is intended 
to include the buyer's full rights 
with respect to future install-
ments despite his acceptance of 
any earliexf non-conforming in-
stallment, 
4. The time of notification is 
to be determined by applying 
commercial standards to a mer-
chant buy|er. "A reasonable 
time" for notification from a re-
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tail consumer is to be judged by 
different standards so that in 
his case it will be extended, for 
the rule of requiring notification 
is designed to defeat commercial 
bad faith, not to deprive a good 
faith consumer of his remedy. 
The content of the notification 
need merely be sufficient to let 
the seller know that the transac-
tion is still troublesome and 
must be watched. There is no 
reason to require that the noti-
fication which saves the buyer's 
rights under this section must 
include a clear statement of all 
the objections that will be re-
lied on by the buyer, as under 
the section covering statements 
of defects upon rejection (Sec-
tion 2—605). Nor is there rea-
son for requiring the notifica-
tion to be a claim for damages or 
of any threatened litigation or 
other resort to a remedy. The 
notification which saves the buy-
er's rights under this Article 
need only be such as informs the 
seller that the transaction is 
claimed to involve a breach, and 
thus opens the way for normal 
settlement through negotiation. 
5. Under this Article various 
beneficiaries are given rights for 
injuries sustained by them be-
cause Oi the seller's breach of 
warranty. Such a beneficiary 
does not fall within the reason 
of the present section in regard 
to discovery of defects and the 
giving of notice within a reason-
able time after acceptance, since 
he has nothing to do with accept-
ance. However, the reason of 
this section does extend to re-
quiring the beneficiary to notify 
the seller that an injury has oc-
curred. What is said above, 
with regard to the extended time 
for reasonable notification from 
the lay consumer after the in-
jury is also applicable here; but 
even a beneficiary can be prop-
erly held to the use of good faith 
in notifying, once he has had 
time to become aware of the le-
gal situation. 
6. Subsection (4) unambigu-
ously places the burden of proof 
to establish breach on the buyer 
after acceptance. However, this 
rule becomes one purely of pro-
cedure when the tender accepted 
was non-conforming and the buy-
er has given the seller notice of 
breach under subsection (3). 
For subsection (2) makes it 
clear that acceptance leaves un-
impaired the buyer's right to be 
made whole, and that right can 
be exercised by the buyer not 
only by way of cross-claim for 
damages, but also by way of re-
coupment in diminution or ex-
tinction of the price. 
7. Subsections (3) (b) and 
(5) (b) give a warrantor against 
infringement an opportunity to 
defend or compromise third-par-
ty claims or be relieved of his 
liability. Subsection (5) (a) 
codifies for all warranties the 
practice of voucher to defend. 
Compare Section 3—8o3. Sub-
section <o) makes these provi-
sions applicable to the buyer's li-
ability for infringement under 
Section 2—312. 
8. All of the provisions of the 
present section are subject to 
any explicit reservation of 
rights. 
Cross References: 
Point 1: Section 1—201. 
Point 2: Section 2—608. 
Point 4: Sections 1—204 and 
2—G05. 
SALES § 2-608 
Point 5: 
Point 6: 
Point 7: 
3—803. 
Point 8: 
Section 2—318. 
Section 2—717. 
Sections 2—312 and 
Section 1—207. 
Definitional Cross References: 
"Burden of establishing". 
Section 1—201. 
"Buyer". Section 2—103. 
"Conform". Section 2—106. 
"Contract". Section 1—201. 
"Goods". Section 2—105. 
"Notifies". Section 1—201. 
"Reasonable time". Section 
1—204. 
"Remedy". Sectipn 1—201. 
"Seasonably", ^ection 1—204. 
§ 2 — 6 0 8 . Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part 
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commer-
cial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value 
to him if he has accepted it 
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity 
would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; 
or 
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his ac-
ceptance was reasonably induced either by the dif-
ficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's 
assurances. 
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reason-
able time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered 
the ground for it and before any substantial change in condi-
tion of the goods which is not caused by their owh defects. It 
is not effective until the buver notifies the seller of it 
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same ri 
with regard to the goods involved as if he had 
Official Comment 
ght, s and duties 
rejected them. 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: Section 69(1) ( d \ (3), 
(4) and ( 5 \ Uniform Sales Act. 
Changes: Rewritten. 
Purposes of Changes: To make 
it clear that: 
1. Although the prior basic 
policy is continued, the buyer is 
no longer required to elect be-
tween revocation of acceptance 
and recovery of damages for 
breach. Both arc now available 
to him. The non-alUrnative 
character of the two remedies is 
stressed by the terjns used in the 
present section. The section no 
longer speaks of "rescission," a 
term capable of ambiguous ap-
plication either to transfer of ti-
tle to the goods or io the contract 
of sale and susceptible also of 
confusion with cancellation for 
cause of an execiited or execu-
tory portion of the contract. 
The remedy under this section is 
instead referred to simply as 
"revocation of acceptance." of 
goods tendered under a contract 
for sale and involves no sugges-
tion of "election" ^i any sort. 
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2. Revocation of acceptance 
is possible only where the non-
conformity substantially impairs 
the value of the goods to the buy-
er. For this purpose the test is 
not what the seller had reason 
to know at the time of contract-
ing; the question is whether the 
non-conformity is such as will in 
fact cause a substantial impair-
ment of value to the buyer 
though the seller had no advance 
knowledge as to the buyer's par-
ticular circumstances. 
3. "Assurances" by the seller 
under paragraph (b) of subsec-
tion (1) can rest as well in the 
circumstances or in the contract 
as in explicit language used at 
the time of delivery. The reason 
for recognizing such assurances 
is that they induce the buyer to 
delay discovery. These-are the 
only assurances involved in. par-
agraph (b). Explicit assuranc-
es may be made either in good 
faith or bad faith. In either 
case any remedy accorded by 
this Article is available to the 
buyer under the section on reme-
dies for fraud. 
4. Subsection (2) requires 
notification of revocation of ac-
ceptance within a reasonable 
time after discovery cf the 
grounds for such revocation. 
Since this remedy will be gener-
ally resorted to only after at-
tempts at adjustment have 
failed, the reasonable time pet 2-
od should extend in most cases 
beyond the time in which notifi-
cation of breach must be given, 
beyond the time for discovery of 
non-conformity after acceptance 
and beyond the time for rejec-
tion after tender. The parties 
may by their agreement limit the 
time for notification under this 
section, but the same sanctions 
and considerations apply to such 
agreements as are discussed in 
the comment on manner and ef-
fect of rightful rejection. 
5. The content of the notice 
under subsection (2) is to be de-
termined in this case as in oth-
ers by considerations of good 
faith, prevention of surprise, 
and reasonable adjustment. 
More will generally be necessary 
than the mere notification of 
breach required under the pre-
ceding section. On the other 
hand the requirements of the 
section on waiver of buyer's ob-
jections do not apply here. The 
fact that quick notification of 
trouble is desirable affords good 
ground for being slow to bind a 
buyer by his first statement. 
Following the general policy of 
this Article, the requirements of 
the content of notification are 
less stringent in the case of a 
non-merchant buyer. 
6. Under subsection (2) the 
prior policy is continued of seek-
ing substantial justice in regard 
to the condition of goods restor-
ed to the seller. Thus the buyer 
may not revoke his acceptance 
if the goods have materially de-
teriorated except by reason of 
their own defects. Worthless 
goods, however, need not be of-
fered back and minor defects in 
the articles reoffered are to be 
disregarded. 
7. The policy of the section 
allowing partial acceptance is 
carried over into the present sec-
tion and the buyer may revoke 
his acceptance, in appropriate 
cases, as to the entire lot or any 
commercial-unit thereof. 
Cross References: 
Point 3: Section 2—721. 
SALES § 2-711 
§ 2—"7 1 1. Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security 
Interest in Rejected Goods 
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or 
the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance 
then with respect to any goods involved, and witih respect to the 
whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2—612), 
the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in 
addition to recovering so much of the price as l(ias been paid 
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as 
to all the goods affected whether or not they have been 
identified to the contract; or 
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this 
Article (Section 2—713). 
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer 
may also 
(a) if the goods have been identified recov| 
vided in this Article (Section 2—502); 
[er them as pro-
or 
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy 
the goods as provided in this Article ($ection 2—716). 
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of accept-
ance a buyer has a security interest in goods iji 
or control for any payments made on their price 
es reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transporta-
tion, care and custody and may hold such goods and resell them 
in like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 2—706). 
n his possession 
and any expens-
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: No comparable index sec-
t ion ; Subsection (3)—Section 
G9i5), Uniform Sales Act. 
Changes : The prior uniform 
sta tutory provision is generally 
continued and expanded in Sub-
section {?>). 
Purposes of Changes and New 
Matter: 
1. To index in this section 
the buyer 's remedies, subsection 
(1) covering those remedies per-
mit t ing the recovery of money 
damages, and subsection (2) 
covering those which permit 
reaching the boods themselves. 
The remedies listed here are 
those availably to a buyer who 
has not accented the goods or 
who has justifiably revoked his 
acceptance. The remedies avail-
able to a buyjr with regard to 
goods finally accepted appear in 
the section dealing with breach 
in regard to accepted goods. 
The buyer 's r ight to proceed as 
to all goods when the breach ia 
as to only sonic of the goods is 
determined by the section on 
breach in installment contracts 
and by the section on partial ac-
ceptance. 
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Despite the seller's breach, 
proper retender of delivery un-
der the section on cure of im-
proper tender or replacement 
can effectively preclude the buy-
er's remedies under this section, 
except for any delay involved. 
2. To make it clear in subsec-
tion (3) that the buyer may hold 
and resell rejected goods if he 
has paid a part of the price or 
incurred expenses of the type 
specified. "Paid" as used here 
includes acceptance of a draft 
or other time negotiable instru-
ment or the signing of a nego-
tiable note. His freedom of re-
sale is coextensive with that of a 
seller under this Article except 
that the buyer may not keep any 
profit resulting from the resale 
and is limited to retaining only 
the amount of the price paid and 
the costs involved in the inspec-
tion and handling of the goods. 
The buyer's security interest in 
the goods is intended to be limit-
ed to the items listed in subsec-
tion (3), and the buyer is not 
permitted to retain such funds 
as he mirht believe adequate for 
his damages. The buyer's right 
to cover, cr to have damages for 
non-delivery, is not impaired by 
his exercise of his right of re-
sale. 
3. It should also be noted that 
this Act requires its remedies to 
be liberally administered and 
provides that any right or obli-
gation which it declares is en-
forceable by action unless a dif-
ferent effect is specifically pre-
scribed (Section 1—106). 
Cross References: 
Point 1: Sections 2—308, 2— 
601(c) , 2—608, 2—612 and 2— 
714. 
Point 2: Section 2—706. 
Point 3 : Section 1—106. 
Definitional Cross References: 
"Aggrieved party". Section 
1—201. 
"Buyer". Section 2—103. 
"Cancellation". Section 2— 
106. 
"Contract". Section 1—201. 
"Cover". Section 2—712. 
"Goods". Section 2—105. 
"Notifies". Section 1—201. 
"Receipt" of goods. Section 
2—103. 
"Remedy". Section 1—201. 
"Security interest". Section 
1—2'U. 
"Seller". Section 2—103. 
CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES 15 USCS §2308 
§ 2308. Implied warranties 
(t) Restrictions on disclaimers or modifications. No supplier may disclaim 
or modify (except as provided in subsection (b)) any implied warranty to a 
consumer with respect to such consumer, product if (1) such supplier 
makes any written warranty to the consumer with respect to such con-
sumer product, or (2) at the time of sale, or within 90 days thereafter, such 
supplier enters into a service contract with the consumer which applies to 
such consumer product, 
(b) limitation on duration. For purposes of this title [15 USCS §§ 2301 et 
seq.] (other than section 104(a)(2)) [15 USCS § 2304(a)(2)] implied warran-
ties may be limited in duration to the duration of a written warranty of 
reasonable duration, if such limitation is conscionable and is set forth in 
dear and unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face of 
the warranty. 
(c) Effectiveness of disclaimers, modifications, or limitations. A disclaimer, 
modification, or limitation made in violation of this section shall be 
ineffective for purposes of this title [15 USCS § 2304(a)] and State law. 
(Jan. 4, 1975, P. L. 93-637f Title I, § 108, 88 Stat. 2189.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Effective date of section: 
For effective date of section, sec 15 USCS § 2312. 
Other provisions: 
For application of this section, see 15 USCS § 2312. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Definitions, 15 USCS §2301. 
Requirement that full warranty may not impose duration limitation on 
implied warranties, 15 USCS § 2304(aX2). 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Am Jon 
55 Am Jur 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade 
Practices §§771.5-771.10. 
67 Am Jur 2d, Sales §§ 425-513. 
Am Jur Proof of Facts: 
Precast Concrete: Defective Design or Manufacture. 16 Ain Jur Proof 
of Facts 2d, p. 595. 
Annotations: 
Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in 
electrical system in motor vehicle. 5 ALR4th 662. 
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PART 455—USED MOTOR VEHICLE 
TRADE REGULATION RULE 
Sec 
455.1 General duties of a used vehicle 
dealer; definitions. 
455.2 Consumer sales—window form. 
455.3 Window form. 
455.4 Contrary statements. 
455.5 Spanish language sales. 
455.6 State exemptions. 
455.7 Severability. 
AUTHORITY: 88 Stat. 2189, 15 U.S.C. 2309: 
38 Stat. 717, as amended 15 UJS.C. 41 et seq. 
SOURCE: 49 FR 45725, Nov. 19, 1984, unless 
otherwise noted. 
EDITORIAL NOTE: At 50 FR 50163, Dec 9. 
1985. in Part 455» the effective date of the 
Used Car Rule as it applies within the State 
of Wisconsin was temporarily stayed to 
June 3,1986. 
§455.1 General duties of a used vehicle 
dealer; definitions. 
(a) It is a deceptive act or practice 
for any used vehicle dealer, when that 
dealer sells or offers for sale a used ve-
hicle In or affecting commerce as 
"commerce" Is defined in the Federal 
Trade Commission Act: 
(1) To misrepresent the mechanical 
condition of a used vehicle: 
(2) To misrepresent the terms of any 
warranty offered in connection with 
the sale of a used vehicle; and 
(3) To represent that a'used vehicle 
is sold with a warranty when the vehi-
cle is sold without any warranty. 
(b) It is an unfair act or practice for 
any used vehicle dealer, when that 
dealer sells or offers for sale a used ve-
hicle in or affecting commerce as 
"commerce" Is defined in the Federal 
Trade Commission Act: 
(1) To fail to disclose, prior to sale, 
that a used vehicle is sold without any 
warranty; and 
(2) To fail to make available, prior to 
sale, the terms of any written warran-
ty offered in connection with the sale 
of a used vehicle. 
(c) The Commission has adopted 
this Rule in order to prevent the 
unfair and deceptive acts or practices 
defined in paragraphs (a) and (b). It is 
a violation of this Rule for any used 
vehicle dealer to fail to comply with 
the requirements set forth in §§ 455.2 
through 455,5 of this part. If a used 
vehicle dealer complies with the re-
quirements of §§455.2 through 455.5 
of this part, the dealer does not violate 
this Rule, (d) The following defini-
tions shall apply for purposes of this 
part: 
(1) "Vehicle" means any motorized 
vehicle, other than a motorcycle, with 
a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) 
of less than 8500 lbs., a curb weight of 
less than 6,000 lbs.v and a frontal area 
of less than 46 sq. ft. 
(2) "Used vehicle" means any vehicle 
driven more than the limited use nec-
essary in moving or road testing a new 
vehicle prior to delivery to a con-
sumer, but does not include any vehi-
cle sold only for scrap or parts (title 
documents surrendered to the State 
and a salvage certificate issued). 
(3) "Dealer" means any person or 
business which sells or offers for sale a 
used vehicle after selling or offering 
for sale five (5) or more used vehicles 
in the previous twelve months, but 
does not include a bank or financial in-
